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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the significance of Derrida’s work for an 
understanding of the basic tenets of phenomenology. Specifically, via an analysis of his 
understanding of the subject’s relation to the future, we will see that Derrida enhances the 
phenomenological understanding of temporality and intentionality, thereby moving the 
project of phenomenology forward in a unique way. This, in turn, suggests that future 
phenomenological research will have to account for an essential (rather than merely a 
secondary) role for both linguistic mediation and cultural and political factors within the 
phenomenological subject itself. 
 
Derrida and the Future(s) of Phenomenology 
 
 
 The relationship between Derrida and phenomenology seems to have reached a 
stalemate. On the one hand, Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology is generally 
restricted to questions of historical influence and reception. On the other hand, many 
Husserlian scholars have troubles with—or flat out reject—Derrida’s reading of Husserl 
as misguided, confused, or both. Reading Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology 
solely through his reading of Husserl, then, enables us to broach the question of 
phenomenology from within Derrida’s work, but its limited scope enables more 
phenomenologically-minded scholars to ignore Derrida as a significant contributor. 
Hence, the stalemate: either Derrida is an important interpreter of Husserl, or he is not; 
this—and this alone—will decide Derrida’s relationship to phenomenology. 
 
 In this paper, I would like to push beyond this stalemate to study what Derrida’s 
importance to the central issues of phenomenology itself. To do so, it will, of course, be 
necessary to examine the function that Husserl plays in Derrida’s thought, but this 
function can only be properly understood in relationship to a third term: Levinas. In the 
context of this (un)holy triumvirate, we can learn three points that get at the heart of 
phenomenology itself: first, the fundamental necessity of futurity, not just to 
phenomenological temporality, but to the phenomenological method itself; second, a 
clarification of the concept of intentionality in a distinctly phenomenological register; and 
finally, a renewed vision of the central problems of phenomenology in terms of the scope 
and application of the phenomenological method. At stake in this discussion of Derrida, 
we will see, is the future of phenomenological research itself. 
 
 In order to fully understand Derrida’s contributions to the future of 
phenomenology, we must first look at his contributions to understanding the future within 
phenomenology. To begin, then, we must highlight the centrality of futurity to two 
distinct accounts of phenomenology and phenomenological intentionality: first, the 
Husserlian account of subjective constitution within horizons; and second, the Levinasian 
account of the reversal of that sense of constitution in the relation to alterity (Section I). 
Then, we will be in position to understand Derrida’s thought—from the early work on 
differance through the later work on justice and the messianic—in the context of these 
competing visions of phenomenology, as offering a phenomenology that holds in tension 
these two competing vision (Section II). From this, we will elaborate the resulting theory 
of intentionality that Derrida can be understood to offer (Section III), before moving on to 
discuss the implications of this theory for the future of phenomenological research 
(Section IV). 
 
I. Futurity and Phenomenology: Two Accounts 
 
 Before we can elaborate the contributions of Derrida to phenomenology, we must 
first explore the phenomenological context in which Derrida thought himself to be 
operating. This context fluctuates between two main poles: the notion of subjective 
constitution, on one hand, and that of openness to alterity, on the other. Let us look at the 
figures emblematic of each those two poles: Husserl and Levinas, respectively. 
 
A. Husserl: Futurity and Subjective Constitution 
 Husserlian phenomenology shows a strong bias toward subjective constitution. 
His analyses focus, not only on how the subject is able to constitute a world, but also on 
how the subject is able to constitute its own subjective lived experiences.1 Hence, 
Husserl divides subjective constitution into three main levels: first, that of the 
constitution of its own stream of experiences via the constitution of internal time; second, 
the passive or non-egoic constitution of the world; and third, the egoically-directed acts 
of consciousness within the world.2 
 
 At each of these levels, we see an essential role played by the future, suggesting 
that a distinctly futural temporality is essential to phenomenology. At the level of internal 
time-consciousness, the Bernau Manuscripts make clear that protention is a key concept 
in Husserl’s accounts of absolute consciousness and of intentionality. Because of the 
distinction in modes of bringing to intuition (that is between clarifying and confirming 
modes)3 that protention alone provides, consciousness is able to confirm the present 
object as the fulfillment of the previously expected object,4 and therefore provide the 
fulfillment necessary for absolute consciousness.5 
 
 Protention is also essential to intentionality. Protention, as “an intention ‘directed’ 
at what comes later,”6 differs most notably from retention because only protention has 
the “striving” character of directedness7  that comprises “the fundamental character of 
[intentionality] in its most original essential composition.”8 
 
Futurity, then, is essential to the functioning of the phenomenological subject on 
the most basic level of its own self-constitution. It also marks the level of the subject’s 
passive constitution of the world: it is only because our previous experiences are retained 
in a horizon “of actual and possible expectations”9 that we are able to expect the non-
present sides of a particular given object (for example, the back of a chair), and therefore 
apperceive what is in front of me as the object that it is (for example, a chair). Later, 
however, Husserl will want to separate the acts of egoic consciousness into those marked 
by absence and those that remain fully present (in enjoyment), and to tie futurity, via 
anticipation, solely to the former.10 This raises the question of how futurity could fail to 
apply to some egoically-directed acts, when it is necessary to the more basic levels of 
constitution that precede them. It is especially problematic when the non-anticipatory acts 
of enjoyment are supposed to occur in the interior mental life of the subject, yet it is 
precisely the subjectivity of the subject that must be constituted—and with an essential 
role played by futurity in that constitution—if Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is 
to move past Kant.11 
 
Husserl says that the forms of subjectivity are “only conceivable in genesis,”12  
and that this notion of genesis is what distinguishes his work from that of Kant (Hua XI, 
126). This problematic notion of genesis in phenomenology provides the starting point 
for Derrida’s own philosophy, but before we move directly to that, let us finish examining 
the phenomenological context of Derrida’s work by elaborating the “other” side of 
Husserl, which he introduced but did not, perhaps, sufficiently develop. To do this, we 
must turn to the figure who did more than any other in phenomenology to develop this 
other side of Husserl: Emmanuel Levinas. 
 
B. The ‘Other’ Husserl, an Other Futurity: Levinas and Alterity 
 
 Where Husserlian intentionality is premised on the directedness of subjective acts 
from the subject to the world, Levinas reverses this move in his characterization of his 
own work on intentionality as a reversal of sense-bestowal [Sinngegebung].13 However, 
for Levinas this is not a move away from Husserl, but rather a reinvigoration of the 
“forgotten horizons” of Husserl’s thought,14 horizons which constituted Husserl’s most 
innovative breakthrough. Levinas understands intentionality as “essentially the act of 
bestowing a sense (the Sinngebung).”15 However, Levinas notes, following Husserl,16 
that this sense-bestowal moves in both directions: intentionality is not merely the act of 
the subject’s bestowing meaning on the world, but is rather the act of the subject’s being 
in relation with the concrete.17 
 
 This act of the subject’s being in relation to something absolutely distinct from 
itself is characterized by Levinas as futurity.18 Whereas for Husserl futurity was about 
subjective constitution within horizons (of retention and expectation), for Levinas futurity 
is about the subject’s being-constituted by that which lies outside itself, and therefore 
comes to the subject in the mode of surprise (TO, 79). This reaches its zenith in Levinas’ 
understanding of the subject as hostage of, or substituted for, the Other, who calls, solicits 
or constitutes the subject in the mode of responsibility. Otherwise than Being is Levinas’ 
landmark attempt to explain this idea, and it claims to “remain faithful to intentional 
analysis” (OB, 183). It can be faithful to intentionality, however, only by reconceiving 
intentionality as a sense-bestowal that is “essentially respectful of the Other” (RR, 121). 
For Levinas, this respect can be maintained only be acknowledging the one thing that he 
believes intentionality makes apparent, more than anything else—that the subject is not 
(only) constituting, but is primarily constituted. 
 
 Against the self-enclosed nature of subjective constitution, Levinas raises the 
specter of an “eschatological” (cf. TI, 22-26) understanding of the subject as being 
always oriented toward—and constituted by—what lies outside itself. But this is not our 
first invocation of eschatology in this paper. Remember that our Husserlian analysis of 
anticipation already introduced a certain eschatological character into the heart of 
experience, characterizing (almost all) subjective experience as already occurring in the 
present, but promising yet more fulfillment in the future. At stake here is the relationship 
between the phenomenological subject and that which is foreign to the subject; the 
relation, in other words, that Husserl meant to describe by the phrase intentionality. 
 
II. Derrida’s Phenomenology of Tension 
 Two distinct accounts of intentionality can be deduced from the accounts of the 
relation to the future discussed so far: on the one hand, past experiences become the 
horizons by which we constitute the present according to expectations of the future; on 
the other, we have a present that makes sense only because the future has reached back 
and offered itself to us partially, in the mode of a trace19 or promise.20 These correspond 
to an intentionality that seeks to move from the subject to the world (a broadly Kantian or 
idealist understanding of intentionality) and an intentionality that seeks to move from the 
world to the subject (a naively realist and perhaps even reductively materialist 
understanding of intentionality).  Neither of these accounts of intentionality is sufficiently 
phenomenological. 
 
 Husserl believed his phenomenology to be unique in that it alone dealt with the 
constitution of the stream of subjective experience (contra the a priori subjectivity of 
Kantian idealism and the lack of significance of subjectivity in materialism). Husserl 
attempts to explain this constitution via the notion of subjective genesis,21 while 
Levinas’ sought the genesis of the phenomenological subject outside that subject. Both of 
these attempts, Derrida claims, fail to pay sufficient attention to the two-fold movement 
of intentionality necessitated by phenomenological genesis, and hence neither is 
phenomenological enough to adequately distinguish phenomenology from other 
philosophical disciplines. 
 
A. The Necessity of Genetic Phenomenology 
 
 This issue of genesis is the starting point of Derrida’s philosophy. Genesis is both 
central to phenomenology and yet constitutes a problem for it because genesis contains 
an apparent contradiction within its very nature: on the one hand, the notion of genesis 
requires a context that is “its own,”22 thus echoing the Husserlian notion of constitution 
with the horizons of the subject; on the other hand, the genesis can occur only in a 
context that “goes beyond” the subject and “envelops it from all sides,”23 thereby 
echoing the Levinasian notion of the constitution of the subject by an Other who 
transcends that subject absolutely.24 
 
  The significance of the future within the competing accounts of Levinas and 
Husserl is not accidental, but is necessary, Derrida claims, if phenomenology “wishes to 
respect the temporality of the originary lived experience,”25 in which “it is always 
through an ‘anticipation’ which is at least formal, that any signification, founded on an a 
priori synthesis, appears, and appears to itself originarily.”26  This is to say that the 
phenomenological principle of principles27 is premised on the self-givenness 
[Selbstgegebenheit] of lived experience, and, since this lived experience gives itself in 
and as time, phenomenology must account for the temporalization of lived experience by 
matching that temporalization with an analogous temporalization in (phenomenological) 
analysis. This temporal analysis, as we will see, is genesis, and therefore every truly 
phenomenological analysis must be genetic phenomenological analysis. 
 
B. Transcendental Genesis 
While Husserl clearly recognized the need for genetic analysis,28 his genetic 
accounts are insufficient because they fail to fully challenge the appeal to universal 
essences. Even in his latest works, where his analyses appear to take on their most 
genetic character, Husserl continues to maintain a rigorous distinction between 
transcendental constitution and empirical existence,29 and decides stridently for the 
former. In doing so, he confines himself to a static search for that which is already 
constituted, instead of that which is constituting. As with any static account, this method 
necessarily privileges one of the two poles of the constituting relation at the expense of 
the other: by focusing on the constituting power of the subject, Husserl runs the risk of 
psychologism, in its transcendental (Kant) rather than its mundane (Mill, Sigwart) 
variation.30 
 
Such a move is not sufficiently phenomenological, Derrida argues, because it 
misses “the origin and becoming of logic” in genesis.31  But as long as the sharp 
distinction is maintained between transcendental constitution and empirical existence, the 
significance of genesis for phenomenology can never be appreciated. That this genesis 
cannot be purely empirical is obvious, given Husserl’s adamant rejection of mundane 
psychologism in volume I of Logical Investigations. But the possibility of 
“transcendental” genesis—that is, the attempt to account for the fact that sense and 
meaning are essentially becoming, as the subject is simultaneously constituted and 
constituting itself and the world—is problematized by its own genetic sense: as an 
essential becoming, “transcendental” genesis must not take place within the realm of 
what is already constituted (if it is to be originary and transcendental), and hence cannot 
appeal to universal essences or constituted subjects. For this reason, a transcendental 
sense of genesis must not reduce historical and factual existence to some universalized 
essence, which would be “no more than a concept in disguise” (PG, xxxviii). Indeed, 
transcendental genesis “must not be the object of a reduction,” for if it is to be an 
originary becoming, “what subject will absolute meaning appear for? How can absolute 
and monadic transcendental subjectivity be at the same time a becoming that is 
constituting itself?” (PG, xxxix). Derrida’s answers by suggesting that, rather than being 
reduced or being revealed by the reduction, transcendental genesis makes possible the 
reduction itself (Ibid.). In order to accurately account for transcendental genesis, then, 
empirical and factual existence cannot be reduced. Yet, simultaneously (and this is the 
paradox, the problem, the seemingly contradictory double-necessity) they must be 
reduced, for it is only after the reduction that something can be rigorously and properly 
transcendental, that is to say, phenomenological.32 
 
This problem, then, establishes a fundamental “dialectic” at the heart of 
phenomenology, a dialectic that is ontological in nature.33 “This ontology,” Derrida 
claims, “will show, by deepening the phenomenology of temporality, that at the level of 
the originary temporal existence, fact and essence, the empirical and the transcendental, 
are inseparable and dialectically of a piece.”34  Because, in Husserl’s analysis of time, 
“every constituting moment … brings with it a constituted moment in the intimacy of its 
foundation,”35  the very absolute of time-constituting consciousness is itself always 
already composed of constituted moments. “This essential intrusion of constituted time 
into constituting time does not allow us to make the distinction rigorously between” pure, 
transcendental constitution and the facticity of existence,36 and so Derrida calls for a 
fundamental reorientation of phenomenology that would “put us in contact with the 
existent as such.”37 The “originarily synthetic identification of consciousness and time” 
prevalent in phenomenology “is equivalent to confusing the pure subject with an 
originarily historical existence that is … the very ‘existence’ of the subject. This 
existence, as originarily temporal and finite, is ‘in the world.’”38 
 
Hence the problem of genesis, the problem of identifying the relationship between 
constituting and constituted, the problem of the passage between “primitive existence” 
and “originary sense,”39 arises precisely because of Husserl’s temporal analyses. It is the 
purpose of genetic phenomenology to speak to this problem, to “retrace the absolute 
itinerary that leads from prepredicative evidence to predicative evidence” (PG 106; 
translation modified40), to explain, in other words, the passage from primitive existence 
to sense. We can now understand the claim already cited that a “phenomenological 
philosophy must be genetic if it wishes to respect the temporality of the originary lived 
experience.”41 
 
C. Phenomenological Genesis 
 
 Derrida attempts to provide such a genetic phenomenology, or at least a 
phenomenological account of genesis. This account grows out of the analysis of the 
originary “dialectic” at the heart of phenomenology. To understand the importance of 
phenomenology to Derrida’s work—and vice versa—we must first understand the central 
importance that this “dialectic” has in Derrida’s philosophy. While this may seem 
surprising, given the fact that this word seems to drop out of Derrida’s work already by 
the early 60s, we will see that, as Derrida continues to explore the idea expressed by this 
term, he is forced to change how he talks about it, ultimately tying such key 
deconstructive themes as differance and the messianic inexorably to the originary 
dialectic that characterizes phenomenology. 
 
i. From Dialectic to difference 
 
In his preface to the 1990 edition of The Problem of Genesis, an older (and 
perhaps wiser and more cautious) Derrida explains that the “law of differential 
contamination” which “imposes its logic from one end of [The Problem of Genesis] to the 
other” received, in 1953/53 a “philosophical name that I have had to give up: dialectic, an 
‘originary dialectic.’”42 This dialectic is a kind of “hyperdialecticism,” a  going beyond 
dialectic “in the course of a very respectful critique,”43 and it will never cease to function 
in Derrida’s work. 
 
The word dialectic, however, does cease to function as a positive aspect of 
Derrida’s work, by 1967. Already in the preface to the 1953/54 version of The Problem of 
Genesis, Derrida speaks of “unperceived entailment or of dissimulated contamination.”44  
This theme of contamination emerges more forcefully into Derrida’s lexicon once the 
word dialectic ceases to play a significant role. Indeed, Derrida himself says that “the 
very word ‘contamination’ has not stopped imposing itself on me from thence [that is, 
1953/54] forward” (PG, xv), as it seeks to show that two things that we take to be 
necessarily separate (like, for example, the subject and the other) are in fact always 
already intertwined (the other is “in” me, to use the phrase of A Taste for the Secret).45 
This preaccomplished intertwining repeats the “originary dialectic” that sought to make 
fact and essence, the empirical and the transcendental, “inseparable and dialectically of a 
piece” (PG, 159). 
 
The language of intertwining or contamination can suggest that, rather than being 
originary, the intertwining is of two pre-existing and originally separate things, and that 
the contamination is therefore a negative situation that longs nostalgically for an earlier 
situation of purity. In suggesting that contamination is but a temporary and secondary 
problem to be overcome, such thinking does not give enough weight to the fundamental 
necessity of the “contamination,” to its productive aspect. 
 
In this regard, the language of economy, which comes to emerge in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” proves useful. In an economy, there is a reduction to a symbolic valuation 
(for example currency) that opens the door to Baudrillardian hyperrealism,46 but also, 
and more importantly for Derrida, to the possibility of exchange, “commerce,” or 
“discourse” between the interested parties. Such symbolic valuation and exchange 
enables, not just the passing on of information, but also the passing on of tradition (and 
hence the progress of science, including philosophy),47 and even, as Derrida is at pains 
to show, the very possibility of discourse with the Other that characterizes Levinas’ 
ethics,48 which themselves both presuppose and are presupposed by phenomenology.49 
 
  Economy, then, refers to both the (productive) exchange between the two inter-
contaminated poles and the (ontological? transcendental?) condition that necessitates and 
makes possible that exchange. But these two meanings are always interwoven, always 
“dialectically” intertwined. In his discussion of Levinas, for example, Derrida will show 
that Levinas fails to capture the radicality of phenomenology (both his own and 
Husserl’s) because he, too, like Husserl, fails to adequately account for the 
interconnection of both sides of economic debate. Derrida speaks of the “transcendental 
origin” that ties together the alterity characteristic of Levinasian ethics and the subjective 
constitution of Husserlian phenomenology as an economy which “will permit access to 
the other to be determined, in ethical freedom, as moral violence or nonviolence,”50 only 
because it is both a pre-condition and the product of such an economic exchange: the 
economic “inter-contamination” is itself the product of such an economy, an originary 
economy that enables the Greek and the Jew to have productive exchange.51  The 
distinction between the two senses of economy, then, must be kept firm (for the sake of 
philosophical rigor), even as what it distinguishes can have no real difference. It is, like 
the distinction between the “parallels” of the transcendental and the empirical in Husserl, 
an irreal distinction which separates (via) nothing. 
 
In Husserl, these strange distinctions can be held together only by the invocation 
of “life”52 as the basis of the lived experiences that make up the subject matter of 
phenomenology. This life is nothing other than a self-relationship that “is its own division 
and its own opposition to its other.”53  Life here does not refer to “day to day life or 
biological science,” but to an “ultratranscendental concept of life” which “requires 
another name.”54  This idea of that which “produces sameness as self-relation within 
self-difference,” which “produces sameness as the nonidentical,” and for which, in order 
to understand, “it was necessary to pass through the transcendental reduction” will come 
to take the name difference.55 
 
 Differance first emerges in Derrida’s work as his name for that movement which 
comes closest to describing the paradoxical genesis or economy at the heart of 
subjectivity. In the sentence immediately following its introduction as a term in Speech 
and Phenomena, Derrida states that the “movement of differance is not something that 
happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject,”56 and does so via a “pure 
difference” that produces “sameness as the nonidentical,”57 thereby constituting the 
living present, in its self-presence, as a trace (SP, 85). Since the trace is the relation of the 
living present with its ‘outside,’ the trace is always an “openness upon exteriority in 
general, upon the sphere of what is not ‘one’s own’” (SP, 86), and as such is not only 
temporal but is “from the outset, a ‘spacing’ …space is ‘in’ time; it is time’s pure leaving-
itself.”58 
 
 Differance, then, stands in as the namesake of an originary supplementation,59  
necessitated by the nonidentity of the subject’s self-relationship, “which at one and the 
same time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial 
division and delay.”60  Such a fissured and retarded presence cannot be thought on the 
basis of consciousness (which is always consciousness as presence, as the living present) 
or non-consciousness. It must, rather, be described on the basis of a pre-subjective (but 
subject-constituting) “time” and “place,” an ultra-transcendental genetic movement that 
always holds in relation “an inside and an outside in general, an existent and a 
nonexistent in general, a constituting and a constituted in general.”61  Differance, in 
other words, is the very “originary dialectic” described in The Problem of Genesis, an 
(ultra-) transcendental counterpart of the notion of economy in “Violence and 
Metaphysics.” 
 
ii. Hauntology and the Tension of difference 
 
 Like the notion of genesis itself, differance is essentially futural. The concept of 
primordial supplementation that is differance implies the non-plenitude of presence that 
Derrida calls, “in Husserl’s language, the nonfulfillment of intuition.”62  We recall that it 
is futurity that, for Husserl, is in its essence nonfulfilled intuition (even as it makes 
fulfillment possible). The temporal non-plenitude of presence is, in phenomenology, a 
futural temporality: it is deferral, a deferral which breaks up the very idea of the living 
present itself. It is the living present itself which, in genetic phenomenology, is deferred, 
and is so “ad infinitum.”63 
 
 This deferral of the present by way of a futural temporality contains within itself 
an apparent duality that must be understood as the product of an originary economy. In 
Specters of Marx, Derrida seeks to make sense of the notion of ‘life’ that is at the centre 
of phenomenology, and which was a starting point for his analysis of differance. For 
Derrida, life is always lived “in the upkeep, the conversation, the companionship” of 
ghosts, which is to say, within a “politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations” 
that is characteristic of our finite existence,64 because what affects the subject “is always 
a revenant,” which is to say that it “begins by coming back,”65 and therefore 
phenomenology can be understood as hauntology, the “logic of haunting.”66 
 
 Derrida invokes the notion of ghosts and haunting here for two opposed but 
intertwined reasons, reasons that result from the unique temporality of genesis, which 
“harbors within itself … eschatology and teleology themselves.”67 These two positions 
characterize an originary economy or dialectic at the heart of the temporality of genesis. 
 
 In one sense, then, phenomenology as hauntology supports the Husserlian 
position of constitution within horizons: the future is nothing more than the outgrowth of 
the past, and hence everything futural is, in essence, nothing more than a repetition of the 
past, “the past as absolute future,”68 where “what seems to be out front, the future, 
comes back in advance: from the past, from the back.”69 
 But Derrida is at pains to show another form of temporality as well,70 one that 
does not unite past and future together in the present (the past-present and the future-
present), but rather one in which “time is out of joint.”71  In invoking “ghosts” as his 
trope of inheritance, Derrida is intending to call forth the personal element of inheritance, 
which makes inheritance a matter of justice, of responsibility.72  This seat of justice is 
located “within that which disjoins the living present,” that is, within the “non-
contemporaneity with itself of the living present.”73  This marks a shift in emphasis from 
Derrida’s earlier discussions of the non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present: 
in differance as discussed above, for example, that which divides the present from itself is 
a what (differance; also, khora, supplement, originary dialectic, etc.), whereas now this 
division is a who.74 This turn to the “who” opens up the question of responsibility for 
Derrida, a responsibility that is also and always a response-ability, the ability to respond 
to the Other who has already called to us.75  As response to the other, the question 
becomes that of arrival, and, as such, a question of the future, of “the regard to what will 
come in the future-to-come [l’à-venir].”76  In the subtle change from l’avenir [future] to 
l’à-venir [future-to-come], Derrida highlights the infinitive form of the future,77 but also 
its personal element of address to [à] another.78 By opening up this infinitive and 
intersubjective element, Derrida reconceives of futural temporality itself along more 
Levinasian lines: “Turned toward the future, going toward it, it also comes from it, it 
proceeds from [provient de] the future.”79  In this, Derrida has made explicit the double-
necessity, the originary dialectic, of differance: first, the future as absolute past, as 
growing out of the past: teleology; second, the future as relation to the address of the 
other, as coming from the future: eschatology.80 
 
iii. The Messianic 
 
 These two senses of the future are captured most succinctly in Derrida’s notion of 
the messianic, which is distinguished into two moments: messianicity81 and messianism. 
Via the general notion of the messianic, Derrida seeks to hold these two accounts together 
in tension, without resolving either into the other.82 It is Derrida’s express intention, in 
making this distinction, to distinguish a “structure of experience” from “a religion,”83 in 
a way similar, I will argue, to the way in which economy refers to both a transcendental 
condition of being “dialectically of a piece,” as well as the productive exchange between 
those dialectical poles in historical and empirical conditions. In the messianic, the 
structure of experience is deemed messianicity, and it accords with the eschatological 
notion of futurity discussed above, while messianism is meant to refer to what is 
produced in particular historical and empirical conditions via the transcendental 
condition,84 and refers to the teleological account discussed above. 
 
 The beginnings of this can be seen in the “predicates” that Derrida ascribes to 
messianicity: “annunciation of an unpredictable future, relation to the other, affirmation, 
promise, revolution, justice.”85  These predicates are fleshed out in Specters of Marx in 
passages such as the following: 
 
Ascesis strips the messianic hope [i.e., messianicity] of all biblical forms, and 
even all determinable figures of the wait or expectation; it thus denudes itself in 
view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the 
arrivant(e), the ‘come’ to the future that cannot be anticipated . . . Open, waiting 
for the event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if its [sic] keeps watch 
over its own universality.86 
 
Fortuitously, the quotation begins with a word that harkens back to the phenomenological 
heritage that Derrida has inherited, and which “haunts” his exploration of the 
messianic.87 This ascesis is the rigorous self-discipline of the phenomenologist 
employing the reduction.88 The lack of content in messianicity, then, is not, contrary to 
some commentators,89 the result of a Kantian quest for formal universality,90 but is the 
result of the epokhē which Derrida holds to be “essential” to messianicity and to “the 
messianic in general, as thinking of the other and of the event to come.”91  If 
messianicity is, then, to a certain extent structural or formal,92 this is only as it relates to 
a futurity (event to come) that is intersubjective (thinking of the other), that is, a futurity 
that puts it in relation with the other who calls me. This is what makes messianicity 
responsible/ response-able (“it thus denudes itself in view of responding”; emphasis 
added) to the Other who must come, who will come, and who must be treated with 
hospitality.93 But this Other, of course, must come as an “event,” and not as the 
outgrowth of the past into a future (present). This aspect of messianicity is marked by the 
term “waiting” above. A non-teleological futurity that waits, open, for the arrival of the 
Other: what is this but eschatology?94 
 
 But this, of course, is only one side of the messianic. On the other side, we have 
the concrete histories of the determinate messianisms. While Derrida says that one may 
see messianicity as “the condition of the religions of the Book,” one may also, and 
equally, consider the Abrahamic messianisms as “the only events on the basis of which 
we approach and first of all name the messianic in general.”95  Messianisms, then, are 
the “other ghost which we cannot and ought not do without” (Ibid.). They would seem to 
be the historical “material” of our horizons, the very horizonality that makes experience 
possible. As such, they operate within the teleological conception of futurity, that 
conception which makes the past into an “absolute future.” 
 
Messianisms, then, provide concretion,96 and a certain urgency, to the open 
waiting of messianicity. While messianicity awaits the future to-come, messianisms keep 
us connected with the past (present), and hence give weight to the future (as future 
present): what comes in the future is urgently important, because, soon, imminently in 
fact, the future will be the present, that is, will be my living present, our experience. But, 
as the living present, it is always already interrupted by the very temporality of that living 
present itself, the differance-ial temporality of phenomenological genesis that Derrida has 
elsewhere shown to be characteristic of “life” in its phenomenological sense. This 
temporality interrupts the living present even as it establishes the living present as both 
“life” and the “present.” In trying to tie both of these movements (the transcendental and 
the empirical) together, the messianic in general is characterized as “urgency, imminence 
but, irreducible paradox, a waiting without horizon of expectation,”97 which is to say that 
it is an “historical opening to the future.”98  As historical (messianism), the messianic 
must be, not only rooted in the past, but also essentially empirical; but as opening to the 
future (messianicity), the messianic must be transcendental, essential, ideal, that is, 
philosophical. It is the task of the messianic (in general) to hold together these two poles, 
without collapsing either into the other. This is the paradoxical condition of the 
messianic. It is also the doubly-necessary condition of differance, and the originarily 
dialectical character of phenomenological temporality. 
 
III. A Genuinely Phenomenological Intentionality 
 
 Earlier, we noted the essential connection between a theory of time as futural and 
an account of intentionality. In this regard, the two distinct accounts of futurity at work in 
phenomenology (teleological and eschatological) accord with two distinct accounts of 
intentionality at work in phenomenology (idealist and naïve realist, or transcendental and 
empirical).99  Derrida’s conception of a futurity of double-necessity would suggest, then, 
that intentionality must maintain both the subjective constitution of the world and the 
ontological constitution of the subject by the world. As Derrida put it in The Problem of 
Genesis, it is a matter of realizing that our “primitive existence” in the world cannot be 
radically distinguished from the genesis of “originary sense,”100 because of the collusion 
of constituted and constituting within the very life of the phenomenological subject.101 
 
 In this, Derrida’s account of phenomenological intentionality echoes that of Fink, 
that great disciple of Husserl, who was compelled to write “The Phenomenological 
Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism” because too many 
philosophers in his day were conflating phenomenology with neo-Kantianism (that is 
with the ‘idealism’ described above). For Fink, the key problem of phenomenology is the 
“question concerning the origin of the world.”102  By investigating the “origin of the 
world,” phenomenology is able to get beneath “dogmatic metaphyics” and its ontological 
and “naïve” conception of the world, and critical (neo-Kantian) philosophy’s concern 
with “the meaning of beings.”103  Phenomenology, in its essence, seeks to unite elements 
of both critical philosophy (that is its transcendental character) and metaphysics (that is 
its concern for the origin of the world), without falling into the sharp divorce between the 
world and the non-world, or between this world and another world, that is the downfall of 
both. 
 
 For Fink, the reduction constitutes a “movement” of knowledge that enables both 
the transcending and the retention of the world within the absolute of transcendental 
subjectivity.104  By this movement, phenomenology seeks to show that the world is not 
“founded” on a distinct “foundational” sphere (for example the God or Being of 
speculative metaphysics), but rather that there is a necessary correlation between founded 
and foundational, between constituted and constituting. In phenomenological 
intentionality, the world is both transcended and yet still present; that is, the world is 
simultaneously constituted and constituting, by reference to its inclusion in the absolute 
that constitutes it, an inclusion that is pre-phenomenological, that is, before the 
reduction.105 
 
The reduction, therefore, reveals the proper theme of phenomenological 
philosophy: the transcendental constitution of the origin of the world within transcendent 
life.106 Via the “habitualities and potentialities of transcendental life,” we see that 
transcendental life is “communalized in the process of constitution,” and therefore that 
transcendental subjectivity is essentially intersubjective.107 
 
In its essence, therefore, phenomenology seeks to challenge the sharp divide 
between the world and the non-world, in part by showing that the world is both 
transcendental and immanent to the absolute that constitutes it, and therefore that the 
world is both constituted and constituting. This is the central meaning of intentionality, 
itself the great breakthrough of Husserlian phenomenology. By way of the reduction, 
which is the method and way of knowing that is “the most essential feature of 
phenomenology’s unique character,”108 phenomenology exposes itself as a movement 
that both transcends the world and simultaneously acknowledges the givenness of the 
world, and hence waits for the sensuousness of that givenness. By so doing, the reduction 
reveals a transcendental subjectivity that is simultaneously monadic and intersubjective 
or communal. And all of these apparent contradictions take place within the sphere of 
“life.” 
 
But “life,” in its phenomenological sense as a “strange unity” of “two parallels” 
that are simultaneously different but yet united, and which is, therefore, united while 
being “its own division and its own opposition to its other,”109 is nothing but another 
name for differance.110  In other words, the very double-necessities that characterized 
Derrida’s understanding of phenomenological temporality—the simultaneous necessity of 
immanence to experience and transcendence of experience, of striving forward in activity 
while also awaiting in passivity, the necessary intersubjectivity of the subject—also 
characterize phenomenology itself in its most basic methodologies: intentionality and the 
reduction. Derrida’s account of differance and the messianic, then, provide not only an 
account of phenomenological temporality, but of phenomenological intentionality, 
indeed, of phenomenology itself. 
 
IV. The Future of Phenomenology 
 
 But, in providing an account of phenomenology, Derrida does much more than 
merely critique Husserl’s understanding of his own project. In bringing to the fore the 
double-movement (or double-necessity) of phenomenological genesis and its centrality to 
phenomenology, Derrida not only elucidates the phenomenological project more clearly, 
but he also poses some problems that must be answered before phenomenology can move 
forward on solid ground. In this last section, I will try to elucidate some of these 
problems, not in the hope of solving them (a task that is far too vast for a paper of this 
type), but so as to try to clearly lay out the questions that future research in 
phenomenology must answer. 
 
 To begin with, by showing that the temporality of the living present of the 
phenomenological subject entails that the subject’s self-relationship is not that of pure 
identity but is rather an identity-in-difference, Derrida brings to the fore the question of 
mediation and its centrality to the heart of the phenomenological method itself. For 
anything to appear to this subject, then, it must find a way of present-ing itself in spite of, 
and by way of, the unique temporality of genesis that both makes possible and interrupts 
the living present. The temporality characteristic of phenomenology’s futural orientation 
is able to function only by way of an originary supplementation, differance, which is “the 
‘in the place of’ (für etwas) structure which belongs to every sign in general.”111  At the 
root of the absolute consciousness of the phenomenological subject is the necessity of the 
structure of the sign, that is, of mediation, and therefore every appearing-to-the-subject, 
every “phenomenon supposes originary contamination by the sign.”112  But the sign 
only works within an arbitrary system of value and originary supplementation,113 in 
which signs are infinitely repeatable (or iterable, in Derrida’s terminology).114 
 
 This explanation of the deferral of the living present “ad infinitum”115 echoes the 
formal infinity of Husserl’s account of ideality as omnitemporality,116 and so raises the 
question of the epistemology that underlies phenomenology. If the genetic temporality at 
the heart of phenomenology delays presence ad infinitum, and so necessitates the 
structure of supplementation, the sign, and mediation more generally, then how can 
phenomenology continue to take as its core epistemological principle the “principle of 
principles”: that “every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of 
cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ authority) offered to us 
in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within 
the limits in which it is presented there?”117  The necessity of supplementation at the 
heart of lived experience problematizes the notion of intuition,118 and the relatively 
simplistic association it seems to make between intuition and self-givenness. If our 
intuition is structured by the “in-the-place-of” structure of supplementation, then must not 
semiotics (or language, broadly construed) play an essential role in phenomenological 
epistemologies, and even, perhaps, in the notion of givenness itself?119 Is a 
phenomenological epistemology not then forced to make sense of the importance given to 
the sign, not just by Derrida, but also by Husserl (for example in “Origin of Geometry”), 
and of the deferral of ideality, not just via the sign, but also via the invocation of the Idea 
in the Kantian sense (that is in the Vienna lecture and the Crisis)?120 
 
 But there is a second notion of infinity also at work in the ‘infinite’ deferral of 
phenonemenological temporality highlighted by Derrida. The formal infinity discussed 
above bears a certain relationship to death (as opposed to the “life” of the living present, 
the life that is another name for differance)121 in that ideal objects must be able to 
function in the absence of the ego thinking those objects, of any ego thinking those 
objects. It is surviving the death of the subject that language makes possible, and hence 
opens the possibility of ideality.122  But given this possibility, sense—which cannot be 
separated from ideality—must also bear some relation to the death of the subject; any 
sense bestowed on the world must function apart from the ego that so bestows that sense. 
It must function, at least in part, ideally. As such, sense goes beyond merely the 
relationship between the ego and the object—it goes also, simultaneously, to the other 
(person), the other “absolute origin and zero point of the world,”123 the other who shares 
in the project of transcendental constitution by sharing in ideality. 
 
This second sense of infinity, then, highlights the differential aspect of differance: 
differance opens the distance between self and Other. But differance also, via language 
(and the formal infinity), entails the possibility of crossing that distance. And the relation 
to the Other is not only a differentiating relationship, it is also a deferring relationship: 
the relationship to the Other is, for Levinas, the relationship to the future (the 
impossibility of fulfillment, the ceaseless striving, etc.). Differance, therefore, not only 
opens the double-necessity that the Other must appear in intuitive presence while 
simultaneously exceeding that intuitive presence, but it also entails the necessarily 
intersubjective, and hence historical and political, influences on the formation of sense. 
That is, if the genetic temporality at the heart of phenomenology has a necessarily 
intersubjective component, then searching for the genesis of sense only within the subject 
itself will necessarily prove inadequate. There are essential intersubjective—and 
therefore ethical and political—concerns that shape the very constitution of sense itself, 
and phenomenology cannot therefore so easily “bracket” these seemingly “empirical” or 
historical concerns as matters of the natural attitude that must be reduced in order to yield 
truly transcendental insights. Rather, as both Derrida and the later Husserl have shown, 
the truly transcendental insights must be only quasi-transcendental, maintaining within 
themselves complex economic relationships to empirical concerns.124 But how can one 
take such concerns seriously and still employ the phenomenological reduction? If 
completing the reduction is indeed impossible,125 how can we conceive of even a partial 
reduction that will help us yield truly (quasi-) transcendental insights? If political and 
historical factors must remain within the scope of phenomenological investigation, what 
must properly be bracketed out from those investigations? How, exactly, is 
phenomenology to deal with historical and political concerns? And is there some room 
for hermeneutics and presuppositions within transcendental phenomenology? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Derrida seems to suggest that phenomenology can be truly transcendental only by 
refusing to cease being empirical.126 While this seems to accord with a genuinely 
Husserlian understanding of intentionality (such as that put forward by Fink), it 
nevertheless raises several problems that must be explored before phenomenology can be 
considered to be on a firm foundation: first, a genuinely phenomenological understanding 
of language must be developed that takes account of the temporality of genesis that 
establishes the living present, but only at the expense of placing supplementation at the 
heart of the subject; secondly, the “principle of principles” can remain the foundation of a 
phenomenological epistemology only if the issue of givenness is revisited in light of the 
necessity of supplementation in subjective intuition; third, given that the living present is 
not only deferred temporally but is differed intersubjectively, phenomenology must be 
able to understand political and ethical concerns as central to any understanding of the 
self-givenness and self-constitution of the subject; and fourth, while the reduction 
remains essential for a transcendental understanding of phenomenology, it must be 
reconceived so as to take adequate account of the fact that empirical concerns are central 
to the subject. Understanding Derrida’s work from within a phenomenological framework 
provides (at least) these four broad problematics as future phenomenological concerns, if 
phenomenology hopes to have a future as a serious philosophical discipline. 
 
 It may be objected, of course, that one need not employ Derrida to get such a 
critique. Surely ‘existential’ phenomenology makes a similar critique of Husserl: 
Merleau-Ponty, for example, clearly critiques Husserl’s account of the reduction (our 4th 
point, above), and Heidegger seems to make political and ethical concerns central to any 
understanding of the self-givenness and self-constitution of the subject (as recommended 
by our 3
rd
 point above). Therefore, the critique we are applying to Derrida seems to apply, 
not to the future of phenomenological research, but rather to its past. 
 
 However, there remains a distinct difference between what Derrida’s work 
suggests is necessary if phenomenology is to continue, and what is offered by Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty.127 This difference is encapsulated by the necessity of placing 
supplementation at the heart of the phenomenological subject:128 that is, it is not clear 
that Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty sufficiently challenge the self-presence of the 
phenomenological subject from an epistemological perspective. While both seem to 
challenge the ontological status of the subject,129 and move phenomenology in new 
directions on that ground, neither, it seems to Derrida, use this breakthrough to challenge 
the epistemological foundations of the phenomenological method.130 The question that 
remains to be answered is whether “existential” phenomenology—as practiced variously 
by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others—has done enough in its “ontological” critique 
to accommodate such an epistemological move (suggesting that they were unaware of the 
far-reaching nature of their own critique) or whether their “ontological” critique was 
insufficiently critical, and hence could not lead to the epistemological critique that 
Derrida deems necessary (suggesting, perhaps, that their critique of Husserl was not as 
radical as they may have hoped).131 
 
 Derrida’s work suggests, then, that not only must phenomenology deal with the 
four broad problematics outlined above, but it must deal with all of them in an 
interconnected manner. This is to say that future phenomenological research must begin 
by accounting for the necessary supplementation at the heart of the phenomenological 
subject before it can advance a sufficiently phenomenological account of givenness, 
transcendence, or the reduction. While such a project seems possible—is at least 
plausible—to what extent it will still be recognized as phenomenology remains an open 
question. The work of Jean-Luc Marion, for example, seems to be such an attempt to 
account for that necessary supplementation (via the notion of the “interlocuted subject”) 
in a way that also grounds a new account of givenness, transcendence and the reduction. 
However, his work is criticized by Janicaud as emblematic of a “swerve” away from 
phenomenology toward something else (in Janicaud’s estimation, theology).132 If what I 
am arguing for in this paper is true and Janicaud is also correct, it seems that 
phenomenology is a self-defeating enterprise: the rigorous pursuit of its goals according 
to its own methods would lead to a move away from those very goals and methods 
toward some other discipline. To re-phrase the problem in more standard Derridean 
language: the end of phenomenology would be phenomenology’s end.133 In order to 
avoid this problem, future phenomenological research must refine its self-understanding 
so as to prove either Derrida or Janicaud wrong. If it cannot do so, the future of 
phenomenology may prove to be shorter than it had imagined. 
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